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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE Ol UTAH 
MARY A N N T U R N E R , 
Plaintiff j 
vs. 
D E P A R T M E N T O F E M P L O Y -
M E N T S E C U R I T Y A N D BOARD 
O F R E V I E W O F T H E I N D U S -
T R I A L COMMISSION O F U T A H , 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
This is a review by the Utah Supreme Court of 
the decision of the Utah Board of Review of June 25, 
1973 which affirmed the decision of the Appeals Ref-
eree of April 19, 1974 denying unemployment benefits 
to the plaintiff from March 11, 1973, twelve weeks be-
fore expected date of childbirth, and continuing for six 
weeks after the date of childbirth. The decision of the 
referee had affirmed a determination of March 22, 
1 
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1973 by the Department of Employment Security, In-
dustrial Commission of Utah, establishing the foregoing 
disqualification. The basis for the denial of unemploy-
ment benefits was the legislative requirement in Sec-
tion 35-4-5 (h) (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, for 
such denial in the period shortly before and after de-
livery of the plaintiff's child.1 Plaintiff challenges such 
legislative requirement under the Equal Protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion of the United States and under Article I Section 
2 and Article IV Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Section 35-4-5 
(h) (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is contrary to re-
quirements of the United States Constitution and/or 
the Constitution of Utah, and an order for the pay-
ment of unemployment benefits in the amount of $54.00 
per week for the weeks of the disqualification period. 
Defendants seek an affirmation of the validity of the 
section. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The Agreed Statement of Facts submitted by the 
parties pursuant to Rule 75 (o), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is as follows: 
i 35-4-5 "An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for the 
purpose of establishing a waiting period: (h) For any week (1) within the twelve calendar weeks prior 
to the expected date of such individual's childbirth and with-
in the six calendar weeks after the date of such childbirth.. ." 
.2 
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1. The appellant duly filed a proper claim for un-
employment benefits, had sufficient base period 
wage credits and was otherwise eligible, except 
for pregnancy disqualification at issue in the 
case. 
2. The appellant was separated involuntarily from 
her work on November 3, 1972 for reasons un-
related to pregnancy. She was pregnant at the 
time, however, and the expected date of the birth 
of her child was established by her doctor as 
June 6, 1973. In application of Section 35-4-5 
(h), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, she was dis-
qualified by the Department of Employment 
Security on March 22, 1973, from receiving 
unemployment benefits for a period beginning 
March 11, 1973, twelve weeks preceding the 
expected date of childbirth, and continuing for 
six calendar weeks after the date of childbirth. 
The disqualification was affirmed by the Ap-
peals Referee on April 19, 1973, and by the 
Utah Board of Review on June 25, 1973. 
3. After filing her claim for unemployment bene-
fits the appellant worked intermittently on call 
as a clerical worker for a manpower service. 
A R G U M E N T 
Point I 
SECTION 35-4-5 (h) (1), U T A H CODE ANNO-
T A T E D , 1953, D O E S NOT V I O L A T E T H E 
3 
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E Q U A L P R O T E C T I O N C L A U S E O F T H E 
F O U R T E E N T H A M E N D M E N T O F T H E CON-
S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S . 
a. T H E S U B J E C T O F T H E SECTION IS 
NOT A N " I N H E R E N T L Y S U S P E C T 
C L A S S I F I C A T I O N " AND, T H E R E -
F O R E , IS NOT O N E R E Q U I R I N G R E -
V I E W U N D E R A N E X C E P T I O N A L 
S T A N D A R D O F CLOSE J U D I C I A L 
S C R U T I N Y . 
A threshold question in this case on the Federal 
constitutional issue is as to the standard of judicial 
scrutiny to be applied to the challenged section of the 
Utah statute. 
In certain limited subject fields the United States 
Supreme Court has held statutory classifications to be 
"inherently suspect" and thus subject, according to the 
Court, to a standard of strict judicial scrutiny. Such 
has been the treatment by the Court of classifications 
based upon (1) race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 
11, 8 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967); Mc-
Laughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222, 
85 S. Ct. 283 (1964); (2) national origin, Oyama v. 
California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-646, 92 L. Ed. 249, 68 
S. Ct. 269 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 216, 89 L. Ed. 194, 65 S. Ct. 193 (1944); 
and (3) alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 
372, 29 L. Ed. 2d 534, 91 S. Ct. 1848 (1971). 
I t is well established that, except for the very 
4 
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limited "inherently suspect" categories, a legislative 
classification will be sustained upon court review unless 
it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relation-
ship to a legitimate governmental interest. Jefferson 
V. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546, 32 L. Ed. 2d 285, 92 
S. Ct. 1724 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 
78, 81, 30 L. Ed. 2d 231, 92 S. Ct. 254 (1971); Flem-
ming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1435, 
80 S. Ct. 1367 (1960); McGowan v Maryland, 366 
U.S. 420, 426, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 81 S. Ct. 1101 (1961); 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 25 L. Ed. 
2d 491, 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970). 
In dealing with sex-related statutory classifications, 
the United States Supreme Court has shown a marked 
disinclination to treat these as "inherently suspect" and 
has not been prone to invoke strict judicial scrutiny. 
See Sew Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We 
Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 Harvard Law 
Review 1499 (1971); Project Report: Toward an Ac-
tivist Role For State Bill of Rights, 8 Harvard Civil 
Rights — Civil Liberties Law Review 271, 305-307 
(1973). 
In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, 30 L. Ed. 2d 
225, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971), the Court unanimously ap-
plied the traditional "rational relationship" standard, 
stated above, to review and invalidate a clearly arbi-
trary preference for men over women in the Idaho pro-
bate law. However, the Court showed no inclination 
to use the case for broadening the standard of judicial 
review. In so holding, the Reed case cited Royster 
5 
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Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 64 L. Ed. 989, 
40 S. Ct. 560 (1920). 
In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 36 L. 
Ed. 583, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (May 1973) the Court, much 
divided, invalidated a Federal statutory distinction in 
treatment accorded to military servicemen and service-
women as to eligibility for dependent's allowances. The 
distinction was defended solely on the basis of admin-
istrative convenience. A plurality of four Justices 
(Brennan, Douglas, White, Marshall) held the statute 
not only to be an invidious discrimination (under the 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause) but also held 
the subject thereof to be "inherently suspect." Justice 
Stewart concurred only that the discrimination was 
invidious but not "inherently suspect." Justice Rehn-
quist dissented, and three Justices (Chief Justice, Pow-
ell, and Blackman) concurred only in the result, declin-
ing to hold sex classifications "inherently suspect" pend-
ing an expression of the will of the people on the Equal 
Rights Amendment now being considered by the states. 
Following Frontiero, a case arose in the Supreme 
Court of Washington (state) similar to the present 
Utah case, Hanson et al v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 
517 P . 2d 599 (January 1974). Claimants challenged 
the Washington State provisions denying unemploy-
ment benefits for seventeen weeks before and six weeks 
after the expected date of birth. The Court carefully 
followed the Frontiero case in holding, as that opinion 
had (though actually not by a majority), the sex classi-
fication to be "inherently suspect." Under the stan-
6 
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dard of strict judicial scrutiny thus invoked, the Court 
found insufficient "compelling state interest" to justify 
the classification and held it to be invalid under the 
Equal Protection clause of the Federal constitution 
and under the equivalent Privileges and Immunities 
clause of the State constitution. 
Since Hanson v. Hutt, however, the United States 
Supreme Court has decided two additional sex dis-
crimination cases under the Equal Protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, each in a manner clearly 
contrary to the departure made by the four prevailing 
justices in the Frontiero case. 
In Kahn v. Shevin, U.S , 40 L. Ed. 2d 
189, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (April 1974), the Court affirmed 
the Florida Supreme Court in upholding a tax exemp-
tion system discriminating in favor of widows and 
against widowers . Six members concurring (Brennan, 
Marshall, and White dissenting), the Court found the 
difference in treatment to be consistent with equal pro-
tection requirements since it rested upon a ground hav-
ing a "fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation" (helping to improve the relative economic 
status of widows). Upon this point the Court again 
cited Reed v. Reed, and Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 
and distinguished the Frontiero case as one in which 
the governmental interest was "solely for administra-
tive convenience." (emphasis in original, Id., 411 U.S. 
677 at 690). 
Of more importance to the present case and of 
more distinct contrast to Frontiero is the latest U.S. 
7 
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Supreme Court case, Geduldig v. Aiello, U.S , 
41 L.Ed. 256, 94 S. Ct. 2485 (June 1974). The classi-
fication under review in that case as to compliance 
with equal protection requirements was a provision of 
the California unemployment compensation disability 
insurance statute, a supplement to the California un-
employment insurance and workmen's compensation 
programs. The statute denies benefits to women for 
disability incident to normal pregnancy and childbirth, 
whereas it allows benefits for certain male sex linked 
disabilities including prostatectomy, vasectomy, circum-
cision, etc.2 
In a seeming complete repudiation of the Frontiero 
position (so characterized by the dissent of Brennan, 
Douglas and Marshall) the Court (six members con-
curring) reversed a three-judge Federal district court 
and reemphasized the traditional standard of review. 
Declaring that a State "may take one step at a time, 
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which 
seems most acute to the legislative mind" the Court 
observed that "Particularly with respect to social wel-
fare programs, so long as the line drawn by the State 
is rationally supportable, the courts will not interpose 
their judgment as to the appropriate stopping point." 
Id. 94 S. Ct. 2485, 2491 (emphasis added). At this 
2 §2626 California Unemployment Insurance Code provides: 
" 'Disability* or 'disabled' includes both mental or physical ill-
ness and mental or physical injury. An individual shall be 
deemed disabled in any day in which, because of mental or 
physical condition, he is unable to perform his regular or cus-
tomary work. In no case shall the term 'disability' or 'dis-
abled' include any injury or illness caused by or arising in 
connection with pregnancy up to the termination of such preg-
nancy and for a period of 28 days thereafter." (emphasis 
added). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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point the court quoted the Dandridge case: "The Equal 
Protection Clause does not require that a State must 
choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or 
not attacking the problem at all." 397 U.S. 471, 486-
487. 
Thus, it appears clear that if the Hanson (Wash-
ington) case were being decided at this time a different 
treatment would be proper, at least as to the standard 
of judicial scrutiny to be applied. The traditional "ra-
tional relationship" standard is still the applicable one, 
perhaps more firmly than ever in light of the very re-
cent cases, and such is the standard which should be 
applied to the classification at issue in this case. 
b. U N D E R T H E O B J E C T I V E S A N D PUR-
P O S E S O F T H E U T A H E M P L O Y -
M E N T S E C U R I T Y ACT, T H E S T A T U 
TORY D E N I A L O F U N E M P L O Y M E N T 
B E N E F I T S S H O R T L Y B E F O R E A N D 
A F T E R C H I L D B I R T H IS SUSTAIN-
A B L E AS A R A T I O N A L E X P R E S S I O N 
OF S T A T E POLICY. 
Assuming the proper standard of review for the 
unemployment insurance pregnancy disqualification is 
that set forth in the Geduldig case, i.e., whether the dis-
qualification is rationally supportable, the Utah dis-
qualification may be examined by analogy to the Cali-
fornia provisions upheld in Geduldig. There are several 
points of similarity in the legislative rationale of the 
California provisions as observed by the Supreme Court 
and the rationale of the Utah pregnancy disqualifica-
tion. 
9 
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1. Basis in insurance principles. The Utah unem-
ployment insurance program, as the name im-
plies, is founded upon insurance principles — 
upon a legislative balancing of the employer 
contributions revenues to the fund and the selec-
tion of insured risk costs. Like the California 
program, Utah's unemployment insurance is 
self-supporting and does not draw upon gen-
eral revenues of the state. Historically the 
program has had a close relationship between 
the scope of contributions coverage and bene-
fits coverage and between the amount of em-
ployer contributions collected and the amount 
of unemployment benefits paid to workers. 
2. Benefits determination features. The California 
and Utah acts both use for benefit determina-
tions such features as weekly benefit amount, 
waiting week, maximum benefit duration, high 
quarter earnings, unemployment as a pre-
requisite, etc. 
3. Objectively definable basis of ineligibility. In 
each act the basis of ineligibility (pregnancy) 
is objectively definable. As the Court observed 
in the Geduldig case, "Normal pregnancy is an 
objectively definable physical condition . . . 
lawmakers are constitutionally free to include 
or exclude pregnancy from coverage of legis-
lation such as this on any reasonable basis, just 
as with respect to any other physical condition." 
94 S. Ct. 2485, 2492. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4. Risk selection or exclusion. Like California, 
Utah insures many unemployment risks, but 
not all such risks. Excluded in the Utah pro-
gram (in addition to near-term pregnancies) 
are students, the disabled, pensioners (partial-
ly ) , the voluntarily unemployed, those unem-
ployed for domestic reasons, fraud feasors, 
those unemployed by their own misconduct, 
strikers, etc. 
5. Similar basis as to coverage limitation. The 
Court recognized that the California issue of 
coverage was not that pregnancy is either dis-
abling or non-disabling, but rather that it is an 
endemic type of health condition excluded from 
the program. Similarly, the Utah unemploy-
ment insurance provisions do not require a 
finding that all pregnant persons are unem-
ployable, but that near-term pregnancy is an 
endemic condition relating to employability and 
hence is not covered by the program.3 On this 
point, the main thrust of plaintiff's brief ap-
pears to be that pregnancy ought to be cov-
ered, which determination is, of course, a leg-
islative one. Pregnant persons are obviously 
neither all employable nor all unemployable. 
3 That pregnancy impacts heavily upon employability and hence 
upon the length of benefit claimant status is evidenced by the 
fact that all female claimants having a benefit year ending the 
twelve months of July 1, 1973 to June 30, 1974, including those 
not disqualified for pregnancy drew unemployment benefits 
for an average of 15.3 weeks. Among these, the claimants 
disqualified for pregnancy, even after deduction of the period 
of pregnancy disqualification drew benefits for an average of 
18.3 weeks. 
u 
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The same may be said about students, pen-
sioners, domestically unemployed, etc. 
Perhaps the analogy could be extended further, 
but the foregoing examples may be sufficient to dem-
onstrate the application of the Geduldig decision to the 
present case and to evidence the abundance of rational 
support for the legislative determinations as to the 
coverage of the Utah unemployment insurance pro-
gram. As the Court concluded in the Geduldig case, 
"The State has a legitimate interest in maintaining the 
self supporting nature of its insurance program. Simi-
larly, it has an interest in distributing available re-
sources in such a way as to keep benefit payments at an 
adequate level . . .These policies provide an objective 
and wholly non-invidious basis for the State's decision 
not to create a more comprehensive insurance program 
than it has." 94 S. Ct. 2485, 2491-2492. 
Point I I 
T H E S T A T U T O R Y SECTION D O E S NOT 
V I O L A T E E I T H E R A R T I C L E I S E C T I O N 2 
OR A R T I C L E IV SECTION 1 O F T H E U T A H 
C O N S T I T U T I O N . 
a. T H E S T A T U T O R Y SECTION IS V A L I D 
U N D E R E S T A B L I S H E D R E Q U I R E -
M E N T S OF T H E E Q U A L P R O T E C -
TION P R O V I S I O N O F A R T I C L E I 
SECTION 2. 
12 
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Since the pregnancy disqualification provisions are 
valid under the Federal equal protection requirements, 
there does not appear to be any reason they would be 
less so under the equal protection declaration found in 
Article I Section 2 of the Utah Constitution. If any-
thing, the Federal provision might be construed as 
having a greater reach, since it is a specific proscription 
upon state government conduct whereas the Utah pro-
vision is part of a general declaration as to the source 
of governmental power and the continuity thereof. 
Constitutional review of statutory provisions by 
this Court has been said to begin with the presumption 
of constitutionality, and the party asserting the uncon-
stitutionality of a statute has the burden of proving his 
assertion, Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, 
Inc., 21 U. 2d 431, 446 P. 2d 958 (1968); Norton v. 
Department of Employment Security, 22 U. 2d 24, 
447 P . 2d 907 (1968); Justice v. Standard Gilsonite, 
12 U. 2d 357, 366 P . 2d 974 (1961). 
In passing upon the constitutionality of statutes, 
the Utah Court has enunciated substantially the same 
standard of judicial review as that discussed with the 
Federal cases above, saying: "If from an analysis of 
the entire situation there appears to be any reasonable 
basis for the requirements imposed by the statute which 
is related to its purpose . . . the statute must be up-
held" Allen v. Merrill 6 U. 2d 32, 35, 305 P. 2d 490 
(1956). More recently, in an equal protection case the 
Court declared, "There is no doubt that the questioned 
statute treats men and women differently. But there 
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is likewise no question but it may treat people differ-
enly, based on classification, so long as there is a rea-
sonable basis for the classification, which is related to 
the purposes of the act, and it applies equally and uni-
formly to all persons within the class." Stanton v. 
Stanton, 30 U. 2d 315, 318, 517 P . 2d 1010 (1974), 
citing State v. Mason, 94 U. 501, 78 P . 2d 920, 117 
A.L.R. 330 (1938); and Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 
U. 476, 206 P . 2d 153, 9 A.L.R. 2d 712 (1949). The 
foregoing rationale, applied by this court in the Stanton 
case closely resembles a summarization of the rationale 
applied subsequently by the United States Supreme 
Court in the Geduldig case, its most recent case examin-
ing a sex-related statutory classification. 
b. A R T I C L E IV SECTION 1 P E R T A I N S 
O N L Y TO E Q U A L T R E A T M E N T O F 
M E N A N D W O M E N I N R I G H T S O F 
S U F F R A G E A N D D O E S N O T P E R -
T A I N TO O T H E R R I G H T S . 
The plaintiff contends, finally, that Article IV 
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution extends, perhaps 
more broadly than the Equal Protection clause of 
Article I Section 2, equal civil rights to men and women 
and that this Section invalidates the unemployment in-
suranse pregnancy disqualification provisions. 
Article IV Section 1 states: 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to 
vote and hold office shall not be denied or 
abridged on account of sex. Both male and fe-
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male citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all 
civil, political and religious rights and privileges. 
If it be assumed, arguendo, that Article IV Sec-
tion 1 was intended to extend to all civil rights matters 
(which it undoubtedly was not) there is no reason to 
conclude that any greater right, pertinent to this case, 
could be extended than the guarantees of equal pro-
tection of the laws contained elsewhere in the State 
and Federal Constitutions. 
More importantly, whether the foregoing assertion 
be correct or not, it appears clear from the history of 
the Section, the background of its adoption, and an in-
terpretation of its language by rules of construction 
well established in Utah, that Article IV Section 1 
refers only to rights of suffrage, i.e., "The rights of 
citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold office . . . " 
Article IV Section 1 is located in the portion of 
the Utah Constitution dealing with rights of suffrage 
and elections. The inclusion of this Section occasioned 
a monumental debate in the Utah Constitutional Con-
vention of 1895 (Proceedings, Constitutional Conven-
tion of Utah 1895, Volume 1), a debate occupying near-
ly two weeks in the time of the convention and extend-
ing over more than 200 pages in the proceedings, Id. 
pp. 407-621. Nowhere in the debate, as reported in the 
proceedings, is reference made to the second sentence 
of Article IV Section 1 regarding equal "political, civil, 
and religious rights." The entirety of the discussion of 
the convention was focused upon the first sentence 
assuring to both sexes the equal right to vote and to 
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hold office. In presenting the Article to the conven-
tion, the Committee on Elections and Suffrage re-
ported: "The Committee by this article have conferred 
upon women the right to vote and exercise political 
privileges equal with men." Proceedings, Id., p. 265. 
(emphasis added). The Article was adopted on April 
8,1895. Proceedings, Id., p. 804. 
Thus, the intent of the framers of the Utah Con-
stitution is clearly evident, to understand the entirety 
of Article IV Section 1 as pertaining only to elections 
and rights of suffrage. 
In matters of statutory and constitutional con-
struction the Utah Court has long followed and often 
applied the rule of ejusdem generis, or Lord Tenter-
den's Rule, as have most other courts. Among num-
erous Utah cases applying this rule have been Town-
send v. Board of Review, 27 U. 2d 94, 493 P . 2d 
614 (1972); Frehner v. Morton, 18 U. 2d 422, 424 P . 
2d 446 (1967) ; Heathmun v. Giles, 13 U. 2d 368, 374 
P . 2d 839 (1962); Hatch Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 3 U. 2d 7, 277 P . 2d 309 (1954); and Dona-
hue et al v. Warner Brothers Pictures Distributing 
Corp., 2 U. 2d 256, 277 P . 2d 177 (1954) (citing 
28 Corpus Juris Secundum 1049). Used as aid in arriv-
ing at the true meaning of a writing, the rule is gen-
erally said by the Court to be that "when general words 
or terms follow specific ones, the general must be under-
stood as applying to things of the same kind as the 
specific." Townsend, Id., at p. 96. 
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If the remarkable record of the Constitutional Con-
vention should leave any doubt as to the intended nar-
row scope of the meaning of the second sentence of 
Article IV Seition 1, it appears clear that under the rule 
of ejusdem generis, the general terms "civil, political, 
and religious rights" therein are limited by the specific 
terms of the first sentence to matters pertaining to the 
right "to vote and hold office." I t might be noted as to 
inclusion of the general term "religious" rights, that 
the issue of suffrage was very much of a religious issue 
during the Convention, the matter being characterized 
as dealing with a God-given right. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully submit that for the reasons 
stated above the provisions of Section 35-4-5 (h)(1) 
are sustainable and valid under the applicable standards 
for judicial review as to constitutionality and are wholly 
consistent with the requirements of the United States 
Constitution and the Constitution of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANTS 
Vernon B. Romney 
Attorney General 
Edgar M. Denny 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
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